WannaCrypt Patch for Windows XP?
Why did Microsoft decide to patch XP to fix the exploit used by this ransomware if they stopped supporting it in 2014? I thought for sure they'd completely cut off anything to do with with XP at all. Do you think there may be more security patches in the future since they're acknowledging that a lot of people still use XP in businesses and hospitals?
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But no, this is likely the one in a million that microsoft actually patched an unsupported os.
I've got a Server 2003 vm to spare, I actually want to go download this virus and see what gives.
I wonder if they'd do this if another one in a million widespread virus comes up in the future, or if they'll just push even harder for everyone to leave XP for real this time. Again.
I remember back in the 95 days when one could connect to any shared folder with a Linux box, change directory to "\..", or some such, and see the entire user's hard drive.
THIS TIME it looks like Windows 10 was not affected, but don't be so sure and smug that that won't be the case next time.
My entire point here is that keeping XP patched and up-to-date is not Microsoft's problem anymore, it shouldn't be held against them if they refuse to fix an OS they dropped support of more than three years ago.
How do you even get this ransomware crap? I don't get strange e-mails with infected documents or go to shady warez sites, so I have no clue.
As far as WannaCry goes... There seems to be a lot of people that think this SMB vulnerability is the only way to get this virus, but that's just not the case. The primary way it gains a foothold in a network is through malicious email attachments.
Also, even if you didn't receive patches, this vulnerability attacks SMB v1.... turn that shit off. You most likely don't need it unless you have some ancient clients and also, please, please, please... turn file sharing off on workstation machines and non-file share / DC servers... If you aren't explicitly sharing files with other machines, then you don't need that feature running.
And further more, every box should have a firewall on and configured... if you're not providing services to the network, block all inbound traffic. You can pretty much stop infections like this dead in their tracks with some simple network security.
You can (and should) go even further by blocking workstation-to-workstation communication on your switches... especially if you're running a large enterprise network. Workstations don't need to talk to each other.
Slight mini rant, but I've been dealing with this all day.